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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED
To HAVE CouNSEL APPOINTED BY THE COURT-On May 16, 1932, petitioner, then seventeen years of age, was arraigned, tried, convicted of murder
in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner was without
legal assistance throughout these proceedings, was never advised of his rights to
counsel, was never informed of the consequences of a guilty plea and, as disclosed
by the record, was considerably confused as to the effect of such plea. In 1945,
he moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which
he was convicted, on the ground that there had been serious· impairment of his
constitutional rights at the arraignment and trial. On appeal the Supreme Court
of Michigan held that there was no error in the trial court's denial of petitioner's
motion. 1 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, per
curiam. De Meerleer v. People of the State of Michigan, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct.
596.
The right of an accused to the assistance of counsel is protected in the
federal courts by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 2 and in. most state
courts by provisions in state constitutions and/or statutes}1 In addition, there are
certain circumstances in which the right of counsel in state prosecutions is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, as an essential requisite to a fair hearing.4 Thus, where an accused is in fact

People v. De Meerleer, 313 Mich. 548, 21 N.W. (2d) 849 (1946).·
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right •.. to have
assistance of counsel for his defense." U. S. Const., Amendment VI.
3 For rulings on the Michigan Constitution and statutes see· note 13, infra. For
full collections of state constitutions, statutes and judicial rulings see Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942).
4 The right to counsel is more strictly observed in the federal courts, where the
Sixth Amendment specifically provides for such right, than in the state courts, where
1

2
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represented by counsel the Supreme Court has held that rulings of the trial
court which prevent effective assistance of such counsel are a denial of due
process of law. 5 Also, the trial court has the duty to appoint counsel, whether
requested, or not, in capital cases where, the accused is incapable of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy or the like. 6
This doctrine has been applied in non-capital criminal cases where it is clear
that the accused is unable, to defend himself and where the questions of law
and procedure are difficult and complicated. 7 But in the absence of such special
considerations, denial of a prisoner's request for counsel in a non-capital felony
case has been held not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 An accused may
waive his right to counsel "if he.knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open," 9 but a plea of guilty is not in itself a waiver of this right.10
Where the accused is not otherwise aware of it, failure of the trial court to advise him of his right to counsel is a denial of due process.11 This doctrine that
the due process clause affords a basis for invalidating a state criminal prosecution where the accused's right to counsel has not been sufficiently observed is a
comparatively recent development, and its limits are not yet sharply defined.12
But it would seem clear that the principal case falls well within its scope. The
Michigan Supreme Court based its decision on the Michigan Constitution and
statute and adhered to a well-established rule of construction that these providue process is the basis for the requirement. "If the accused . ••• is not represented by
counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his • • • right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 at 468, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1934). The requirements under the Fouz:teenth Amendment are clearly much less stringent. For the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment should make the Sixth applicable to state action, see dissenting
opinion of Black, J., in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62•8. Ct. 1252 (1942).
~ Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. II6 (1945) (perfunctory defense by
public defender without consultation); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 65 S. Ct. 517
(1945) (denial to prisoner of continuance to consult his counsel).; Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932) (failure of court to give defendant reasonable time
to consult counsel and prepare defense); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S. Ct.
978 (1945) (too little time to consult with appointed counsel). But cf. Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S. Ct. 321 (1940), and Canizio v. New York, (U.S.
1946) 66 S. Ct. 482. See 46 CoL. L. REv. 647 (1946).
6
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323
U.S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363 (1945). Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370
- (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S. Ct. u6 (1945).
7
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324
U.S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978 (1945).
8
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942); Johnson v. Mayo,
(Fla. 1946) 28 S. (2d) 585, cert. den., (U.S. 1947} 67 St. Ct. 492.
9
Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 at 279, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942); Carter
v. Illinois, (U.S. 1946) 67 S. Ct. 216.
10
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989 (1945); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275, 61 S. Ct. 574 (1941).
11
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989 (1945).
12
See Boskey and Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure,"
13 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 266 (1946); 42 CoL. L. REV. 271 (1942).
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sions are permissive only.18 But procedure in state courts must conform to the
minimum requirements of due process as defined by the Supreme Court. Not
only does this court's position as to the facts of the principal case seem unequivocably clear, but also a broad rule concerning assignment of counsel, modeled,
perhaps, after the procedure in the federal courts, 14 would seem to be preferred
policy.15

Frank H. Roberts

13 The Michigan Constitution, Art. II, § 19 (1908) provides that 'in every
criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right • . • to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Two statutes deal with the right to counsel. 3 Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) § 17129, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) § 28.854, provides that the party
accused "shall be allowed to be heard by counsel." 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929)
§ 17486, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) § 28.1254, provides that where the trial judge
appoints an attorney to conduct the defense, he shall be entitled to receive compensation from• the county treasurer. The Michigan rule of construction is that the first
statute is only declaratory of the Constitutional provision, and that the latter guarantees
the right to employ counsel, not to have counsel appointed at public expense. The
second statute permits the trial judge to appoint an attorney to represent an accused,
but it is not mandatory in any case. See People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N.W.
818 (1923), and People v. Crandall, 270 Mich. 124, 258 N.W. 224 (1935). The
latter is truly a "white horse" case.
14 Rule 44 of the federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "If the defendant appears
in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign
counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."
15 Boskey and Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure,"
13 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 266 at 278 (1946).

